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Casenote
BLADES OF STEAL?
THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF SPORTS CLUBS' WEBSITES
AND MEDIA RIGHTS IN MADISON SQUARE GARDEN, L.P. V
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
I. "WANT TO Go?" AN INTRODUCTION
The gloves have been dropped in the fight for the future of
professional sports leagues with the first legal altercation between a
professional sports club and league over the ownership of Internet
and new media rights.' Though clashes between a "rogue" owner
and the authority of a professional league over antitrust law are not
unique in the sports arena, such issues have typically involved mat-
ters of relocation, television broadcasts, or traditional sponsorship.
2
Unsurprisingly, the dispute involves the only league in which
gloves are able to be dropped legally, the National Hockey League
("NHL"), which has struggled to reestablish steady revenue after a
lockout resulted in the cancellation of the 2004-2005 season, has
found itself dodging haymakers thrown by the New York Rangers.
3
Madison Square Garden, L.P. ("MSG"), a subsidiary of cable jugger-
naut Cablevision, owns the Rangers. 4 MSG has accused the league
1. See David Naylor, New Media, New Squabble for NHL, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.globesports.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.200 7 1005.wspt-
nhI-spat-05/GSStory/GlobeSportsHockey/?page=rss&id=RTGAM.200 7 1005.wspt-
nhl-spat-05 (recognizing importance of MSG antitrust suit against NHL).
2. See id. ("A rogue owner willing to take on the authority of a professional
sports league is not unique."). "Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis successfully took
on the NFL a quarter-century ago. Similarly, James Dolan, the chief executive of-
ficer of Madison Square Garden, is a maverick." Id.
3. See Gary Thorne, NHL vs. Rangers May be Key Clash This Season, USA TODAY,
Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/columnist/thorne/200
7
-
11-01-nhl-rangers-caseN.htm (providing basic explanation of suit and potential
ramifications in wake of lockout).
4. See Larry Brooks, Breaking the Nice, N.Y. PosT, Sept. 30, 2007, http://
www.nypost.com/seven/09302007/sports/rangers/breaking-the-nice.htm?
page=0 (discussing financial status of league after lockout). In a letter to twenty-
nine other NHL owners, Dolan wrote, "After sacrificing a season to set our player
cost economics on a proper footing, we believe that the League continues to
squander opportunities to improve our business and solidify and grow our fan
base." See id.; see also Associated Press, Leafs Most Valuable NHL Team, Forbes Rates,
MSNBC.coM, Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21697592/ (discuss-
ing Forbes Magazine article that determined that "Original Six" member Rangers
operate in largest cable market in country and boast net worth of $365 million,
second only to Toronto Maple Leafs at $413 million).
(123)
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of squandering opportunities to improve its business and solidify
the league's fan base through its post-lockout initiatives, thereby vi-
olating section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by stripping the
Rangers of its ability to be "responsive to [its] fans" and "react to
changing business opportunities or events."5
The debate reinvigorates the clash between clubs in large and
small markets. 6 Teams operating in large markets, such as the
Rangers, believe that they can generate greater profits through in-
dependent control of their various property rights. 7 In contrast,
sports leagues seek to protect the collective interests of the league,
as well as smaller market teams that predominantly benefit from
having a league effort that generates fan interest and revenue that
these teams could not accomplish individually.8 As a result, a Rang-
ers' victory in its antitrust suit would threaten the competitive struc-
ture of a league forced to implement a hard salary cap to address
the growing disparity in revenue generated between teams.9
The potential implications of this disagreement could also in-
flict a knockout on other professional leagues that have been allo-
cated teams' intellectual property rights and streamlined their Web
presence with common templates under a central league office, in-
cluding Major League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Football
League ("NFL"), and the National Basketball Association
("NBA") .10 If MSG were to win its antitrust suit, the resulting opin-
ion could seriously constrain the rights of any sports league to col-
lectivize property rights when even a single team desires to opt out
5. See Brooks, supra note 4 (discussing how NHL failed to take any meaningful
initiatives regarding globalization, other than redesigning clubs' uniforms to capi-
talize on retail sales).
6. See Thorne, supra note 3 (raising discussion of large market versus small
market dynamic present in antitrust claims).
7. See id. (stating position of large market teams).
8. See id. (discussing opposing views of small market teams in generating reve-
nue through media rights).
9. See Brooks, supra note 4 (describing effects of hard salary cap on teams'
individual interests).
10. See Hilary Potkewitz, Dolan Confronts NHL Brass over Rangers' Site, 23
CRAIN's N.Y. Bus. 41, Oct. 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20111934 (noting other
leagues with central league office controlling Web presence of teams and stream-
lining websites with common templates); see also Posting of Marc Edelman to
Sports Law Blog, New York Rangers File Antitrust Lawsuit Against NHL, http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2007/10/new-york-rangers-file-antitrust-lawsuit.html (Oct. 4,
2007, 16:27 EST) [hereinafter New York Rangers File Antitrust Lawsuit] ("This suit is
especially interesting in that it seeks to reverse what is now more than a 40-year
trend of sports leagues expanding the allocation of property rights at the league
level.").
[Vol. 16: p. 123
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of a proposed agreement."' Furthermore, all prior non-unanimous
league votes effectuating allocation of broadcast and merchandis-
ing rights and revenue sharing could be called into question.
12
Consequently, the stakes of collectivization are even greater for the
NHL since, whereas other sports leagues have become heavyweights
by generating significant revenue from league-sponsored activities,
the NHL has remained in the lightweight ranks, with ninety-three
percent of its revenue garnered at the local level.
13
Accordingly, this Casenote will engage in a discussion of the
legal implications of league control of Internet and marketing
rights through the lens of the ongoing slugfest between MSG and
the NHL.14 Section II will provide the play-by-play of the dispute,
highlighting the events which instigated the Rangers' allegations of
anticompetitive tactics against the NHL.15 It will also detail the
code of conduct regulating the fight, namely the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890.16 Section III will detail the district court's dismissal of
MSG's motion for a preliminary injunction in order to analyze the
court's application of Section 1 of the Act and discuss whether the
Rangers' assertions are viable under a "quick look" or Rule of Rea-
son analysis. 17 Furthermore, Section IV will explore whether the
NHL could successfully assert a "single-entity" defense if the case
went to trial, exempting the league from amenability to antitrust
law altogether in the market of Internet and new media.18 Finally,
Section V will conclude by reestablishing the potential implications
11. See New York Rangers File Antitrust Lawsuit, supra note 10 (exploring poten-
tial implications of MSG win in lawsuit).
12. See id. (describing how outcome could essentially mandate unanimous vot-
ing to effectuate any league action).
13. See Eric McErlain, The Ice Sheet: Rangers Take League to Court Over Web Con-
trol, FANHoUSE, Oct. 1, 2007, http://sports.aol.com/fanhouse/2007/ 10/01/the-
rundown (stating that only seven percent of total revenue of NHL is from media
and merchandising deals). Likewise, despite the fact that thirty percent of NHL
players are European, the league currently derives only $4 million from European
operations. See id. In comparison, the NBA pockets around $125 million per year.
See id.
14. For a further discussion of the dispute between MSG and the NHL, see
infra notes 20-237 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the history of the dispute between MSG and
the NHL, culminating in the subject lawsuit, see infra notes 20-38 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a further discussion of the provisions contained in section 1 of the
Sherman Act, see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the dismissal of MSG's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction by the district court, see infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the "single entity" exemption to the Sherman
Act, see infra notes 180-238 and accompanying text.
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of the decision on the NHL and other professional sports leagues
that employ a similar marketing structure. 19
II. THE INITIAL TIE UP: BACKGROUND OF MSG's DISPUTE WITH
THE NHL
A. Implementation of NHL New Media Strategy
As early as 1996, the NHL began to take initial steps to improve
the strength of the league brand by providing fans with more mul-
tidimensional hockey coverage that emphasized the importance of
league games and news. 20 A critical element of this national brand-
building strategy was a centralized NHL website to encourage and
facilitate Internet traffic by fans among various clubs' websites. 21
The member clubs of the NHL, agreeing that the right to develop
and exploit the Internet as a marketing tool resided in the league
itself, granted Commissioner Gary Bettman broad discretion to
carry out the NHL's objectives through the entity NHL ICE, includ-
ing authority to make decisions regarding advertising and market-
ing rights. 22
In June 2000, the teams modified their approach, concluding
that the optimal business model was a hybrid where the league's
and clubs' websites would be integrated, with certain elements avail-
able on the clubs' sites and others accessible on NHL.com. 23 In-
ternet regulations promulgated by Commissioner Bettman
included setting aside a portion of each team website as an NHL
area for league content, reserving for the league the right to con-
19. For a further discussion of the potential repercussions of the antitrust suit,
see infra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
20. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL
3254421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (describing initial step taken by NHL to
expand hockey to compete with other sports and entertainment offerings).
21. See id. (finding that goal of NHL was to "translate the passion of fans for
their local teams into League-wide support" to generate additional value for
league).
22. See id. at *2 (explaining alliance with IBM, later "NHL ICE," to initiate
Internet presence). The NHL clubs had already signed away to the league, on an
exclusive basis, the worldwide rights to use or license team trademarks for advertis-
ing, sale, and distribution of products and services to maximize the value of intel-
lectual property rights. See id. The Rangers approvingly voted on that grant. See
id.
23. See id. (noting board's unanimous reaffirmation that league possessed
right to exploit clubs' intellectual property on Internet, based on rules promul-
gated by Commissioner).
[Vol. 16: p. 123
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trol thirty-five percent of all advertising on each club's website, and
requiring merchandising sales to be made through the league.
24
Further, in December 2005, the Commissioner formed a com-
mittee comprised of ten teams to develop a plan to maximize new
media revenues. 25 This New Media Committee concluded that the
best approach for the NHL would be to transfer each team's site
onto a common technology platform, serviced by a single content
management system ("CMS").26 Individual clubs would be held re-
sponsible for supplying local content and advertising, while the
NHL would retain space for national advertising and league news.
27
Under this plan, the NHL could attract national sponsors by selling
inventory across all club websites, thereby achieving a critical mass
for advertisers and reducing transaction costs involved with negoti-
ating advertising space.28
MSG objected to the New Media Committee's considerations
by expressing concern that small market teams would benefit at the
expense of large market teams, amounting to revenue sharing.
29
Despite the Rangers' objections, the league voted to proceed with
the plan set forth in the Committee's report, extend the license
agreements held by the NHL for an additional ten years, and grant
to the NHL the exclusive ability to exploit various new media
rights. 30
In February 2007, the NHL and the Rangers met privately to
discuss the adopted Internet regulations. 31 After failing to reach an
agreement, the Rangers launched three initiatives that violated
league rules: setting up an Internet store for selling Rangers' mer-
chandise, inserting "virtual advertising and signage" into the broad-
24. See id. (delineating club regulations). The Rangers made no objection to
these regulations. See id.
25. See id. at *3. "[The Committee] found that most clubs were not using
their websites as marketing or sales promotions tools at all; were not utilizing best
practices or up-to-date technology; and that most Clubs had not adequately mone-
tized their websites." Id. James Dolan declined a position on the Committee. See
id.
26. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *3 (stating basic plan for
centralized league control).
27. See id. (describing division of responsibility between league and club).
Reasons identified for the transition included: Ensuring minimum quality stan-
dards across team sites, enabling greater interconnectivity, facilitating sharing of
local content, and the creation of two million dollars in savings. See id.
28. See id. (explaining economic efficiencies resulting from plan).
29. See id. (presenting Rangers' open rejection of idea of revenue sharing
amongst small and large market teams).
30. See id. at *4 (describing final agreement).
31. See id. (noting meeting to discuss "differences of opinion on a variety of
issues").
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casts of Ranger home games, and streaming live broadcasts of
Rangers games to Internet subscribers in the team's local broadcast
territory. 32
The league responded in April 2007 with a cease and desist
letter that indicated that the Rangers would be fined $100,000 per
day if they continued to incur such violations. 33 Though the organ-
ization eventually backed down from its actions in violation of the
New Media Strategy, 34 MSG soon thereafter filed a complaint for
injunctive relief, claiming it was required to "hand over its website"
and that the NHL planned to "take over" their website,
newyorkrangers.com. 3 5
The complaint also alleged that the NHL had become an "ille-
gal cartel" in its attempts to prevent off-ice competition between
and among clubs, with no legitimate competitive justification for
seizing the Rangers' website other than to suppress or eliminate
competition.3 6 Similarly, MSG asserted that the New Media Strat-
egy was not "reasonably necessary for the success of the NHL ven-
ture" and constituted a "naked horizontal restraint in the absence
of competitive justification. 3 7  In November 2007, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied MSG's motion
for a preliminary injunction. 38
32. See id. (describing MSG's actions in violation of New Media Strategy).
33. See id. (stating response of league to violations).
34. See id. (asserting that MSG remained in violation for two days). During
meetings that summer, the Rangers insisted on operating their website, newyor-
krangers.com, from its own server instead of migrating the site to a single CMS, or,
alternatively, allowing the NHL to run a parallel site, rangers.nhl.com. See id. The
NHL, however, found this unacceptable because unanimous approval was essential
to ensure minimum quality standards and facilitating fan navigation. See id. Hav-
ing failed to reach a deal, the NHL informed the Rangers that, at the start of the
2007-2008 season, the team would be fined $100,000 for each day that it operated
its website out of the league platform. See id. at *5.
35. See id. at *5 n.5 (outlining basis for complaint under Sherman Act).
36. See id. at *5 (alleging violation of antitrust laws because not "reasonably
necessary" and constituted "naked horizontal restraint"). MSG also sent a letter
out to the other 29 NHL owners, which stated:
We have repeatedly expressed our belief that individual clubs could
achieve the same or better results by entering the new media business on
their own terms, rather than being mandated to submit to a league-wide
initiative. Moreover, the NHL's projection of revenues and implementa-
tion of this plan has been flawed - the June projected results were already
$12.6 million behind plan for the first two years, even after reducing
spending by $2.7 million.
McErlain, supra note 13.
37. Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *5.
38. See id. at *9 (stating judgment of motion). The decision was subsequently
affirmed by the Second Circuit in March 2008. See generally Madison Square Gar-
den, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07-4927-cv, 2008 WL 746524 (2d Cir. March 19, 2008) (find-
[Vol. 16: p. 123
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B. Sherman Act of 1890
The Sherman Act contains two main provisions.39 Section 1
outlaws "every contract, combination. . . , or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions. '40 Because every contract could be construed as a restraint of
trade if section 1 was literally applied, the Supreme Court has held
that for a claim to be actionable under the Sherman Act, the sub-
ject contracts, combinations and conspiracies challenged must im-
pose an unreasonable restraint on trade or commerce. 41 Moreover,
the Act only applies to interstate commerce and not to either intra-
state trade or interstate activity that is not commerce. 42 In addition,
a defendant corporation may present certain defenses including
the "single entity" defense in which it claims that apparent re-
straints are, in fact, the unified acts of a single enterprise.
43
ing MSG's argument to be without merit). In June, the NHL retaliated by filing a
counter-complaint for breach of contract, contending that MSG breached its con-
tract by challenging league rules, pursuant to Article 3.10 of the NHL constitution,
and requesting suspension or termination of MSG ownership of the Rangers. See
Lynn Zinsler, NHL Hits Back After Suit by Rangers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/sports/hockey/2Orangers.html (discussing disci-
plinary threat made by NHL).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (2004) (stating Act). Under Section 1, "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal." Id. § 1. Section 2 makes it unlaw-
ful for a company to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize," trade or commerce
through improper means. Id. § 2.
40. Id. § 1. Single economic entities are not subject to section 1 scrutiny be-
cause there must be an agreement between at least two independent economic
actors (commonly called "concerted action") to satisfy the "contract, combination
... or conspiracy" requirement. See Edward Mathias, Comment, Big League Per-
estroika? The Implications of Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 203, 206
(1999). Accordingly, "[t]he traditionally organized professional sports leagues
have long argued that they are in fact single entities, and that their practices are,
therefore, not subject to section 1 challenges that various league rules tend to
attract," since a sports league is "a unique business, containing an unusual but
necessary mixture of interparticipant competition and cooperation not found in
any other kind of partnership or joint venture."
Id. at 209. However, the actions of a single corporation can still be regulated
under section 2 of the Act. See id. at 206.
41. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984)
("[A]s we have repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit
only unreasonable restraints of trade.").
42. See Gregory Pelnar, Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues, LEXECON, 41 (Oct.
12, 2007), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5382/1/MPRA-paper_5382.pdf
(addressing scope of Act). Although section 1 prohibits concerted anticompetitive
behavior, it does not regulate unilateral action, which is instead governed exclu-
sively by section 2. See id.
43. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984) (finding that parent and subsidiary may have "unity of purpose or a com-
mon design" for antitrust purposes); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans, Lou-
isiana Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (noting unique structure of
7
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C. Proving Antitrust Violations Under the Sherman Act
Conduct may be found to be an illegal restraint of trade under
either the doctrine of per se illegality or Rule of Reason standard. 44
1. Per Se Illegality
Per se illegality may be "invoked when surrounding circum-
stances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as
to render unjustified further examination of the challenged con-
duct. '45 It is appropriate where the challenged practice is "entirely
void of redeeming competitive rationales. '46 A plaintiff must only
demonstrate that the defendant engaged in the alleged conduct,
that the conduct had little anticompetitive effect is no defense. 47
Therefore, practically, the doctrine of per se illegality will only be
applied to a particular course of conduct after courts have had con-
siderable experience with the type of conduct challenged and have
continually found that the conduct produces proscribed conse-
quences in such a significant proportion of cases that a more prob-
ing inquiry in every instance would be wasteful of judicial
resources.48 Action which has been found to constitute a per se
violation includes horizontal price fixing (i.e., price fixing by pro-
ducers of competing products), vertical price fixing (i.e., buyer and
seller agreement on a specific resale price) and allocation of mar-
kets or customers. 49
2. Rule of Reason Analysis
Conduct which is not deemed a per se offense is, alternatively,
judged under a Rule of Reason analysis. 50 A Rule of Reason analy-
sports leagues as business entitities); Chicago Prof 1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95
F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Copperweld to NBA broadcast rights). But see
North American Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (C.A.N.Y. 1982) (rejecting
single entity exemption status for professional sports leagues); NHLPA v. Plymouth
Whalers, 419 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding hockey league to be multiple
actors and not single entity, since existence was only constituted by twenty member
teams).
44. See id. (describing standards of review).
45. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 104 (1984).
46. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998)
47. See id. (prescribing when per se rule appropriate).
48. See 54 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 51 (2008) (describ-
ing practical rationale for finding per se illegality).
49. See Pelnar, supra note 42, at 41 (providing examples of per se illegal re-
straints on trade); see also Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667,
677 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing possibly illegal restraints in NBA).
50. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105 (defining "unreasonable" restraint under
Rule of Reason). A determination of a restraint as unreasonable may be based
[Vol. 16: p. 123
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sis is an appropriate standard of review where an agreement be-
tween members of a joint venture has both legitimate purposes as
well as anticompetitive effects.51 Rule of Reason entails an inquiry
into whether the challenged agreement is one that encourages or
suppresses competition, balancing the procompetitive effects of a
restraint against any anticompetitive effects. 52 In general, courts
have consistently analyzed challenged conduct under the Rule of
Reason when dealing with sports leagues, an area of industry in
which some horizontal restraints are necessary for the availability of
the product.
53
A starting point in a Rule of Reason inquiry is identification of
the relevant market, the group of products or services with which
and geographic areas within which the defendant's products effec-
tively compete and will be restrained.54 Distinguishing the proper
market is necessary to "identify[ ] competitive conditions within the
industry, contrast[ ] the market positions of the defendants with
those of their competitors, and gaug[e] the likely competitive im-
pact of the challenged restraint."55
A Rule of Reason approach places the initial burden on the
plaintiff to show that an agreement created a substantially adverse
effect on competition. 56 If this burden is met, the defendant must
then come forward with evidence of procompetitive virtues that off-
either on: (1) the nature or character of the contracts; or (2) surrounding circum-
stances giving rise to an inference or presumption that they were intended to re-
strain trade and enhance prices. See id. Rule of Reason analysis is the standard
traditionally applied to the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under
the Sherman Act. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977).
51. See NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1259 (2nd Cir. 1982) (outlining how
Rule of Reason analysis differs from per se illegality).
52. See id. (explaining that procompetitive justifications must outweigh ad-
verse effects).
53. See NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers, 419 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (listing
precedent for applying Rule of Reasons to sports entities).
54. See William C. Holmes, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2007) (defin-
ing relevant market). "Since market power is a prerequisite to being able to re-
strain trade unreasonably the first issue in establishing a violation of the rule of
reason is the determination as to whether the defendant possesses market power in
the relevant market where the alleged anticompetitive activity occurs." 54 AM. JUR.
2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2008). "Market power" is defined as "the
ability of a firm . . .to raise price above the competitive level without losing so
many sales so rapidly that the price increase is unprofitable and must be re-
scinded." Pelnar, supra note 43, at 43.
55. William C. Holmes, ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2007).
56. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (outlining shifting
burdens of proof in Rule of Reason analysis).
9
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set the alleged wrongful conduct.5 7 If the defendant demonstrates
procompetitive effects, the plaintiff bears the responsibility of show-
ing that the conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legit-
imate objectives or that they may be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner.58 Once these steps are met, the harms and ben-
efits are weighed against each other to determine whether the be-
havior, on balance, was reasonable. 59
Furthermore, an abbreviated version of the Rule of Reason
technique has also emerged, known as the "quick look" analysis. A
quick look standard differs from the Rule of Reason approach in
that it entails only a simplified market analysis to establish a prima
facie case, relieving the plaintiff of having to rigorously prove the
relevant market, defendant's market power, and anticompetitive ef-
fects. 60 Rather, the adverse anticompetitive effects must simply be
intuitively obvious. 61 Some courts, however, still require that the
"rough contours" of an allegedly affected market must also be suffi-
ciently distinguished and obvious to judge the likely competitive im-
pact of the defendant's conduct.62 In either case, the quick look
doctrine preserves the per se rule's presumption of likely competi-
tive harm as a basis for plaintiffs prima facie case unless and until
defendants demonstrate a procompetitive business justification. 63
57. See id. at 1020 (explaining defense of legitimate rationales for challenged
restraints).
58. See id. at 1019 (putting burden back on plaintiff when procompetitive effi-
ciencies shown).
59. See id. (concluding test with balancing of interests).
60. See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F.Supp. 2d 563,
573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (contrasting Rule of Reason and quick look based on varying
burdens of proof).
61. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455 (LAP), 2007 WL
3254421 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (defining quick look standard).
62. See Holmes, supra note 53 (commenting on slightly more stringent burden
of proof in some courts under quick look).
63. See The Truncated or "Quick Look" Rule of Reason, June 25, 2007, http://
www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/3Persepap.shtm. The quick look analysis is distin-
guishable from both per se illegality and Rule of Reason analysis in that:
To the extent that the cases otherwise would have received per se treat-
ment, truncation refines modem trends in per se analysis by requiring a
closer examination of the proffered justifications. To the extent that the
cases otherwise would have been evaluated under the rule of reason,
truncation lightens plaintiffs burden through a willingness to find com-
petitive harm in the very nature of the restraint, just as the per se rule
presumes that certain conduct entails adverse effects.
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III. THROWING SHORT JABs: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF
PRELIMINARY MOTION
A. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL
1. Rejecting the Quick Look Approach
The district court quickly dismissed MSG's initial argument
that a quick look analysis was the applicable standard of review, em-
phasizing that quick look, or truncated Rule of Reason, is only ap-
propriate when anticompetitive effects are obvious, and "an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
'could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." 64 The NHL's
New Media Strategy did not constitute a "naked restraint" because
it had plainly evident legitimate procompetitive virtues, making the
quick look doctrine inapplicable. 65 The court recognized that the
use of a common technology platform would enable the league to
further its growth strategy of enhancing the NHL's national brand
to compete with other professional sports and entertainment prod-
ucts and their websites. 66 Increased online scale and a standardized
layout would help attract national sponsors and advertisers and en-
able them to reduce transactions costs, since negotiations would
take place entirely with the league. 67 In addition, the New Media
Strategy was intended to "assure minimum quality standards across
team websites; increase the interconnectivity across the NHL.com
network; facilitate the sharing of team content; and reduce the
costs of operating thirty 'back office' website operations, among
other reasons."68
The court also found MSG's comparison with NCAA v. Board of
Regents of University of Oklahoma, in which the NCAA violated anti-
trust laws through its plan for limiting television coverage of college
football games, to be misplaced. 69 Unlike NCAA, in which price fix-
64. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *6 (defining quick look
standard of observer with "rudimentary understanding").
65. See id. (concluding New Media Strategy not "blatantly anticompetitive"
and "far from obvious" that it lacked procompetitive justifications).
66. See id. (recognizing that central website would facilitate traffic amongst
fans on nhl.com). As NHL Deputy Commissioner Bill Daly stated, "The more we
can translate the passion of fans for their local teams into League-wide support,
and the more fans we can get to follow the NHL playoffs and the Stanley Cup Final
... the more value we can generate for the NHL ...." Id. at *1.
67. See id. at *6 (calling New Media Strategy "obvious advantage [ ] of one-stop
exploitation of the intellectual properties of the [thirty] teams").
68. Id. (listing specific procompetitive efficiencies).
69. See id. at *7 (rejecting that NHL New Media Strategy imposes naked re-
straint on price and output like television coverage plan in NCAA).
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ing of particular telecasts, exclusive contracts amounting to group
boycott of potential competitors and artificial limitations on the
production of televised football coverage harmed consumers, no ev-
idence existed to show that hockey fans would similarly receive no
benefit from the NHL's chosen measures. 70 Rather, the NHL's
consumers preferred the websites under the New Media Strategy to
those operated by individual clubs.
71
Also, the court in NCAA found no procompetitive efficiencies,
noting that college football could have been marketed just as effec-
tively without the challenged television plan.72 The NHL, on the
other hand, created a centralized management system as an inte-
gral part of its strategy to promote a league brand and
"perpetuat[e] hockey as one of the national games of the United
States and Canada .... -73
Finally, the district court rejected MSG's assertion that a sports
joint venture may only impose internal restraints that are necessary
for the product to be available at all because the "necessary stan-
dard" was used in NCAA to explain why per se analysis was inappro-
priate.74 The court also believed that it would be inconsistent with
prior case law that has generally upheld agreements among parents
of ajoint venture to not compete with the joint venture in the mar-
ket in which it operates. 75
2. Finding that MSG Failed to Sustain its Burden Under Rule of
Reason Analysis
The district court additionally concluded that MSG failed to
carry its burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticompetitive
restraint under a Rule of Reason standard. 76 Foremost, though
MSG identified several potential relevant markets in its complaint,
70. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *7 (distinguishing NHL
New Media Strategy by suggesting strategy provides public benefit).
71. See id. (noting record showed fans' preference for centralized website
control).
72. See id. (explaining that NCAA television plan did not enhance competi-
tiveness of college television football rights).
73. See id. (finding NHL's plan reasonable first step toward improving "pur-
pose and object" for which league is organized).
74. Id. (stating that restraints need not only be "necessary" forjoint venture to
function at all).
75. See id. ("Agreements among the parents not to compete with the joint
venture in the market in which the joint venture operates generally have been
upheld as reasonable ancillary restraints.") (quoting 1 ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Antitrust Law Developments 470 (6th ed. 2007)).
76. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *8 (concluding that MSG
failed to demonstrate adverse effect on relevant market or market power).
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it provided no evidence "defining the relevant market," which must
first be delineated in order to illustrate an actual adverse effect on
competition. 77 Further, MSG's two reply expert declarations only
asserted that: (1) a centralized league website would reduce compe-
tition in the New York metropolitan area; (2) the league could not
market itself better on a collective basis than on an individual team
basis; and, (3) a team website was an invaluable marketing tool for
the Rangers brand.78 These assertions, however, were not enough
to establish that the NHL's actions created an actual adverse effect
on competition in the relevant market or market power. 79 Moreo-
ver, MSG incorrectly focused on the harm that the NHL's New Me-
dia Strategy potentially posed on its own ability to cross-market its
various other products on the newyorkrangers.com website. 80 The
court distinguished that antitrust laws were enacted for the protec-
tion of competition, not individual competitors. 8'
Finally, even if MSG had shown that the NHL created an an-
ticompetitive restraint, the NHL met its burden of providing offset-
ting procompetitive benefits. 8 2 By centralizing the teams' websites
and preventing the Rangers from operating a rival site, the league
promoted uniformity, facilitated fan navigation, attracted advertis-
ers, reduced transactions costs in advertisement negotiations and
prevented individual clubs from "free-riding" off of the league's ef-
forts.8 3 As a result, MSG was unsuccessful in demonstrating a likeli-
hood of success on the merits.8 4
77. Id. (emphasizing prerequisite of proving adverse effect is defining
market).
78. See id. (attacking MSG's expert declarations).
79. See id. (concluding that moving newyorkrangers.com to CMS not suffi-
cient enough to constitute an adverse effect). Rather, "output" is not merely a
quantitative assessment but also involves a qualitative, market-based judgment. Id.
80. See id. (explaining MSG's allegation of harm that common website tem-
plate could cause to its promotion of other MSG offerings).
81. See id. (distinguishing that antitrust laws based on protecting competition
in market, not merely one competitor from another).
82. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *9 (finding procompeti-
tive justification satisfied, shifting burden to MSG to prove challenged restraint not
reasonably necessary).
83. Id. (listing NHL's stated benefits of New Media Strategy). "This finding is
bolstered by the fact that MSG has shown no harm whatsoever to consumers, espe-
cially in light of the facts that the team maintains control over most of the content
of the new website and fans can still get access directly to the Rangers site through
newyorkrangers.com." Id.
84. See id. (denying request for preliminary injunction).
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IV. CONNECTING WITH AN UPPERCUT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
MSG CLAIM
A. The MSG Court Correctly Dismissed a Quick Look Analysis
The district court was justified in concluding that the quick
look technique was not an appropriate standard for reviewing the
NHL's New Media Strategy. 85 Pursuant to antitrust doctrine, a
plaintiff is required to show that its loss resulted from acts that re-
duced output or raised prices to consumers and were obvious to an
observer with a rudimentary understanding of economics.8 6 In
other words, plaintiff's prima facie burden may be satisfied by a pre-
sumption of competitive harm from the very nature of the chal-
lenged conduct.8 7 Even such naked restraints, however, may be
legal if offset by specific procompetitive justifications.8 8 Accord-
ingly, not only does the arrangement made by the NHL not obvi-
ously impose an anticompetitive effect on customers or markets
through output restrictions, but it also provides several procompeti-
tive virtues.8 9
1. Quick Look Analysis in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma
In NCAA, the Supreme Court concluded that it was obvious
that the NCAA's plan limiting live television broadcasts created a
horizontal restraint on the ability of member institutions to com-
pete because under the agreement, universities could not compete
against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights
that could be offered to broadcasters. 90 The plan placed a ceiling
on the number of games that institutions could televise, artificially
85. For a further discussion of the district court decision, see infra notes 104-
32 (analyzing decision based on precedential case law).
86. See Chicago Prof l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir.
1992) (stating that unreasonable restraint must affect output or price); see also
Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *6 (explaining quick look standard).
87. See The Truncated or "Quick Look" Rule of Reason, supra note 63 (defining
plaintiffs burden of proof under "quick look").
88. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1984)
(finding NCAA college football television plan constituted "naked restraint" on
price and output).
89. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *9 (finding several justifi-
cations that prevented New Media Strategy from being "naked restraint," including
uniformity and decreased transaction costs).
90. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 ("[T]he NCAA member institutions have created
a horizontal restraint - an agreement among competitors on the way in which they
will compete with one another.").
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limiting the quantity of televised football available.91 In addition,
the "minimum aggregate compensation" paid to the participating
institutions operated to preclude any negotiation of price with
broadcasters, thereby imposing a means of horizontal price
fixing.92
Finding naked restraints, the Court required the NCAA to pre-
sent some competitive justifications.93 The Court also rejected the
NCAA's proffered justifications, including marketing efficiency and
enhanced competitive balance. 94 Principally, NCAA football could
be marketed just as effectively without the plan. 95 In addition,
though the Court acknowledged that a certain degree of coopera-
tion is necessary to foster and preserve competition among amateur
athletic teams to enhance public interest, the specific restraints on
telecasts failed to "fit into the same mold as" truly equalizing rules,
such as those defining conditions of the contest, eligibility, or re-
sponsibilities and benefits of those participating in the joint ven-
ture. 96 The television plan was not related to any readily
identifiable group of competitors nor did it present any evidence of
91. See id. at 99-100 (concluding minimum aggregate price for broadcast
rights constituted price fixing). "Ensuring that individual members of ajoint ven-
ture are free to increase output has been viewed as central in evaluating the com-
petitive character ofjoint ventures." Id. at 114 n.54.
92. Id. at 114-15 ("Here production has been limited, not enhanced. No indi-
vidual school is free to televise its own games without restraint."). The Court
stated:
[T] he amount that any team receives does not change with the size of the
viewing audience, the number of markets in which the game is telecast,
or the particular characteristic of the game or the participating teams.
Instead, the "ground rules" provide that the carrying networks make al-
ternate selections of those games they wish to televise, and thereby obtain
the exclusive right to submit a bid at an essentially fixed price to the
institutions involved.
Id. at 93.
93. See id. at 109 ("This naked restraint on price and output requires some
competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.").
"Both lower courts found not only that NCAA has power over the market for inter-
collegiate sports, but also that in the market for television programming - no mat-
ter how broadly or narrowly the market is defined - the NCAA television
restrictions have reduced output, subverted viewer choice, and distorted pricing."
Id. at 110.
94. See id. at 113-15, 117-20 (finding plan's controls did not serve any legiti-
mate procompetitive purpose).
95. See id. at 114 (concluding no marketing efficiencies existed).
96. Id. at 117, 119 ("[T]he NCAA imposes a variety of other restrictions de-
signed to preserve amateurism which are much better tailored to the goal of com-
petitive balance than is the television plan .... "). "There is no evidence that this
restriction produces any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than
would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-pro-
ducing activity." Id.
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an "intent to equalize the strength of teams in Division I-A with
those in Division II or Division III [or] even a colorable basis for
giving colleges that have no football program at all a voice in the
management of the revenues generated by the football programs at
other schools." 97
2. Finding Naked Restraint in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA
Similarly, in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA
the Seventh Circuit held that an NBA rule prohibiting television
superstations from carrying more than twenty games per season or
telecasting games in competition with Turner Network Television
("TNT") constituted an unreasonable restraint on output.98 Own-
ers had agreed that only networks that gained league authority
could nationally telecast, despite the objections of the Chicago
Bulls and their local station, WGN. 99
The court stated that agreements limiting to whom and how
much a firm may sell its product are the defining characteristics of
illegal cartels. °00 The NBA's plan constituted a restriction on out-
put by definition because it capped the number of games which
could be televised, regardless of whether more persons watched
fewer, more attractive games. 10 1 Furthermore, the limitation on
the volume of telecasting lacked any explanation connecting the
practice to consumer benefits.10 2
Though the NBA attempted to justify the telecasting rule by
alleging that it prevented clubs from "misappropriating" the prop-
erty right of the league to exploit its symbols and success, the NBA
97. Id. at 118-19 "The plan simply imposes a restriction on one source of reve-
nue that is more important to some colleges than to others." Id.
98. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 677 (7th Cir.
1992) [hereinafter Bulls I] (finding no reason to overturn district courtjudgment).
The NBA sold telecasting rights to both the National Broadcasting Company and
Turner Network Television, granting the right to broadcast 26 and 50 regular-sea-
son games, respectively. See id. at 669. Each club could telecast 41 games per sea-
son to their home markets and air the other 41 on local cable, keeping the
proceeds. See id.
99. See id. at 669 (noting ownership agreement to NBA broadcasting plan).
100. See id. at 674 ("Agreements limiting to whom, and how much, a firm may
sell are the defining characteristics of cartels and may not be invoked as justifica-
tions of a cutback in output.").
101. See id. at 673 (finding prima facie evidence of reduction in output).
102. See id. at 674 ("[A]ny agreement to reduce output measured by the num-
ber of televised games requires some justification - some explanation connecting
the practice to consumers' benefits - before the court attempts an analysis of mar-
ket power."). "Unless there are sound justifications, the court condemns the prac-
tice without ado. . . ." Id.
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teams still retained the intellectual property rights in their games
through the NBA articles and bylaws, and the league had not ac-
quired any property interest in the telecasts.103 Thus, the league
was merely shortening the list of stations to which clubs could sell
rights that it possessed. 104 Moreover, even if the league did possess
such rights, its control over intellectual property to prevent misap-
propriation still failed to provide a benefit to the consumer
welfare.105
4. Application of Case Law to MSG v. NHL
a. Rejecting the Claim of Naked Restraint
In contrast to both NCAA and Bulls I, the NHL's New Media
Strategy did not, on its face, present any apparent anticompetitive
consequences. 10 6 Unlike the NCAA plan, which hindered institu-
tions' ability to compete and deviated from a free market model by
preventing negotiable television agreements and the amount of
games televised, and the NBA agreement, which restricted the num-
ber of telecasts, the NHL allowed the Rangers to retain some con-
trol over local stories, information and other content, as well as
thirty-five percent of advertising on its website. 10 7 In addition, the
league permitted the continued and coextensive use of the newyor-
krangers.com domain with its own ranger.nhl.com domain.108
Moreover, the NHL, in its private meetings with the Rangers,
agreed to construct a section of the rangers.nhl.com website about
the team's history, refrain from posting stories about local rivals the
New York Islanders and New Jersey Devils on the homepage and
move local advertising to a more prominent position on the site. 109
103. Id. (describing attempted justification made by NBA for restraining out-
put and price with regard to telecasts).
104. See id. at 674 ("A cartel could not insulate its agreement from the Sher-
man Act by giving certain producers contractual rights to sell to specified
customers.").
105. See id. (explaining that procompetitive justification is based on effects of
television policy on consumers' welfare, not whether NBA held contractual prop-
erty rights).
106. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (contrasting restraints in NCAA with
those alleged by MSG).
107. See id. at *2, *5 n.5 ("It is also undisputed that, under the New Media
Strategy, the Rangers will retain the responsibility and opportunity for populating
its website with local stories and information about local players and games ....").
108. See id. (adding that NHL did not force discontinuation of newyor-
krangers.com domain).
109. See id. at *4 (stressing aspects in which Rangers retained control over its
website).
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In short, such practices were not of the type "ordinarily condemned
as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because the
probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high,"110 as
MSG still played a significant role in dictating its output.11'
b. Assessing Procompetitive Justifications of the NHL Common
Platform
Even if the restraint created by the NHL Strategy initially de-
creased output, as long as it "in the end expands output" and
"serves the interests of consumers," it would still constitute a valid
plan under a quick look analysis. 112 Accordingly, the New Media
Strategy is designed to increase production and remains responsive
to consumer demand and preference. 113 Whereas the NCAA
broadcast offering kept viewers from watching games for which
there was a large viewer interest, choosing instead to air games for
which little or no demand existed,1 4 the NHL insisted on the oper-
ation of a single CMS to enhance the quality and popularity of
clubs' individual websites in furtherance of a league brand, allowing
for it to "compete for the good-will of fans and . . .optimize the
monetization of internet sponsorship and advertising opportuni-
110. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) "[A]
per se rule is applied when 'the practice facially appears to be one that would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."' Id.; see
also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)
("Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are
thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry
into the harm it has actually caused."). The Supreme Court in Copperweld
continued:
Other combinations, such as mergers, joint ventures, and various vertical
agreements, hold the promise of increasing a firm's efficiency and ena-
bling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such combinations are
judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and market
structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect.
Id.
111. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *9 (finding no restraint
in output where team retains control over website).
112. Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir.
1992) ("A 'restraint' that in the end expands output serves the interests of consum-
ers and should be applauded rather than condemned.").
113. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *7 ("[T]he only evi-
dence in the record suggests that fans prefer the websites under the New Media
Strategy over the old.").
114. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 n.34 ("Perhaps the most pernicious aspect is
that under the controls, the market is not responsive to viewer preference.").
"[C] onsumers, the viewers of college football television, receive absolutely no ben-
efit from the controls. Many games for which there is a large viewer demand are
kept from the viewers, and many games for which there is little if any demand are
nonetheless televised." Id.
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ties."115 Likewise, centralization permits the NHL, through scale
economies, to respond to consumer demand more efficiently and
effectively.' 16 As a result, the NHL platform creates "best of breed"
features, accommodating teams' specific needs within the frame-
work of the common platform and template to both monetize local
advertising and sponsorship revenue while attracting fans through
an attractive and user-friendly experience.
117
An action by a league that initially reduces output may also be
justified because it serves to promote rivalry for a more attractive
product, which, in turn, draws a larger audience.118 For instance,
in Bulls I, the court stated that a rule keeping some popular games
off superstations could help weaker teams attract the support of
their local markets by encouraging in-person attendance. 119 By
promoting exciting and competitive games, small market teams
could sustain gate revenue to finance their operations and there-
fore be able to better compete with larger market clubs.
120
Similarly, by enacting the CMS, the NHL develops fans' enthu-
siasm and interest in other teams.' 21 The NHL found that most
hockey fans were "tribal" and "team-centric," as viewership of na-
tionally televised games depended largely on whether the con-
sumer's favorite team was playing. 12 2 Through centralization of
115. Declaration of Ted Leonsis at 5, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL,
2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (No. 07 CIV. 8455 (LAP)).
116. See Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher at 62, Madison Square Garden,
L.P. v. NHL, 2007 WL 3254421 (No. 07-CIV-8455 (LAP)) (discussing how unified
media strategy develops national brand and allows NHL to respond more effi-
ciently to consumers).
117. Declaration of Ted Leonsis, supra note 115, at 150 (explaining how
New Media Strategy benefits through both common template and accommodating
teams' individual needs).
118. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir.
1992) ("Rivalry makes for a more attractive product, which then attracts a larger
audience - the very expansion of output that the antitrust laws foster."); see also
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 118 (rejecting competitive balance as justification because no
single league or tournament existed in which all college football teams compete;
therefore, there was no true competition to equalize).
119. See Chicago Prof l Sports Ltd. P'ship, 961 F.2d at 673 (explaining possibility
by which initial restriction on output could later increase output).
120. See id. (describing restriction that serves to maintain competitive
balance).
121. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (stating centralized platform's goal was
that it helps draw fan interest to other teams in largely "team-centric" league).
"One problem that the NHL has had is bridging fan support for local teams with
interest in the sport as a whole. Hockey fans ... are less likely to watch the playoffs
once 'their team' is eliminated than are fans of other sports." Id.
122. Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 61 ("[Hockey
fans] tend to be fans of their local or favorite team more so than fans of the
19
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teams' websites to create a league-wide experience, small market
clubs could generate incremental revenue from national sponsors
and advertisers which they could not attract on their own, as well as
a more expansive interest in their teams and star players, resultingly
improving their ability to compete against large market teams and
broadening their fan base. 1 23
Furthermore, the New Media Strategy acts as an effective en-
forcement mechanism to deter "free-riding."'124 In Bulls I, the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized that teams that take advantage of costly
league efforts, without paying for them, reduce the payoff for clubs
making an investment into that venture. 125 Consequently, such in-
vestments in design and distribution of league products become
less attractive, to the ultimate detriment of consumers. 126 As a re-
sult, the court recognized control of free-riding as an accepted justi-
fication for cooperation. 27 Similarly, if the Rangers or another
NHL team failed to abide by the common platform strategy, it
would profit from the willingness of other teams that promote the
NHL at the expense of surrendering some of its individual auton-
omy over website design and corresponding intellectual property
rights, while bearing none of the costs of surrendering this
autonomy.128
sport.") "Because hockey fans' viewership of nationally televised games depends
heavily on whether their favorite team is playing, the value of national television
contracts is diminished. Among the four major sports, the NHL has the smallest
increase in TV ratings from the regular season to the playoffs .... Id.
123. See Declaration of Ken Sawyer at 1 4-5, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v.
NHL, 2007 WL 3254421 (No. 07 CIV. 8455 (LAP)) ("[T]he NHL.com platform
will allow the [Pittsburgh] Penguins to reach out to and communicate more effec-
tively with a national and international audience, and we expect that it will help us
build a broader fan base.").
124. Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 17 ("Free-riding
would lead to inefficient outcomes because the League, its member teams, or its
players would not have the appropriate incentive to invest in the promotion and
development of the product if an individual team alone were allowed dispropor-
tionately to capture the benefits from those efforts.").
125. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674-75 (7th
Cir. 1992) (describing detriments of free-riding).
126. See id. (stressing ultimate harm to consumers).
127. See id. ("Control of free-riding is accordingly an accepted justification for
cooperation."). "Free-riding is the diversion of value from a business rival's efforts
without payment." Id. at 675.
128. See Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 31-33 (discuss-
ing how allowing teams "free rein to exploit NHL intellectual property" would lead
to free-riding on efforts of collective league action).
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The NHL New Media Strategy is also justifiable because it pro-
motes "interbrand" competition. 129 The Supreme Court in NCAA
held that the NCAA plan, enabling the association to penetrate the
market through an attractive package sale, was a "unique product
for which there [was] no ready substitute."1 30 Since college football
had no competitors, no need existed for collective action. 13 1 How-
ever, the Court left open the possibility that such a restraint could
be appropriate for a venture to enhance its ability to compete if
faced with interbrand competition from available substitutes.1
32
Conversely, the NHL New Media Strategy represents such an
intrabrand strategy that fosters interbrand competition through: in-
creased online scale, standardized layouts and interconnectivity;
sharing of team content; and reduction of transaction costs that al-
low the NHL to better compete against other providers of sports
and entertainment products and their respective websites. 133 As ex-
plained by Washington Capitals' owner and AOL executive Ted Le-
onsis, the NHL centralized platform allows the league to compete
for fans' time and disposable income against both other profes-
sional sports organizations and "dot.com entities," since
"[c] onsumers .. .have become more computer savvy and expect
their entertainment when they want, where they want and how they
want."134
B. The District Court Appropriately Concluded that MSG Failed
to Sustain its Burden of Proof Under a Rule of Reason Analysis
Under the Rule of Reason analysis, a determination of the rea-
sonableness of a particular restraint-whether the restraint im-
posed is one that merely regulates and promotes competition or,
alternatively, suppresses or destroys competition-requires a case-
by-case application with the fact-finder taking all circumstances into
consideration to balance the business arrangement's positive and
129. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (finding "interbrand" competition suffi-
cient justification for restraint).
130. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984).
131. See id. at 131 ("There is no need for collective action to enable a product
to compete against nonexistent competitors.").
132. See id. at 115 n.55 ("If the NCAA faced 'interbrand' competition from
available substitutes, then certain forms of collective action might be appropriate
in order to enhance its ability to compete.").
133. See generally Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421 (listing numerous
procompetitive justifications of NHL platform).
134. Declaration of Ted Leonsis, supra note 115, at 10 ("The internet's abil-
ity to interface with wireless technology is clearly the source of future revenue
growth for all professional sports.").
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negative effects on competition in the relative market. 135 To estab-
lish a violation under the Rule of Reason, a claimant must prove
that: (1) a relevant market was affected by the challenged restraint;
(2) the defendant possessed market power within that market; (3)
anticompetitive effects existed in the intrabrand or interbrand mar-
ket; and, (4) the negative effects on competition were not out-
weighed by the positive effects on competition. 136
1. Defining the Relevant Market
The "relevant market" under the Rule of Reason standard is
the particular group of products or services with which the defen-
dant's product effectively competes within a specified geographic
area. 1 37 Such products or services "'are reasonably interchangeable
with, as well as identical to, the defendant's product' affected by the
rule or regulation being challenged."'138 Identification of the mar-
ket is necessary as an initial step to identify competitive conditions
within that industry, contrast the market positions of competitors,
and gauge the competitive impact of the alleged restraint. 3 9 For
instance, in NCAA, the market was defined as "live college football
television," since alternative programming had a significantly differ-
ent audience appeal. 140 By defining the market in this way, the
135. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 48 (2008) (listing
factors used in balancing); see also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (describing balancing under Rule of Reason standard). The analy-
sis includes an ascertainment of facts peculiar to the particular business, including:
(1) the condition of the enterprise before and after the restraint was imposed; (2)
the probable or actual effect of the restraint; (3) the history of the restraint; (4)
the reason for adopting the restraint; and, (5) the purpose sought to be attained
by the restraint. See id.
136. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 48 (2008) (citing
Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1350
(S.D. Fla. 2003)) (setting out elements needed to sustain Rule of Reason claim).
Adverse economic effects are based on the percentage of the business controlled
by the venture and the strength of remaining competition. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D
Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2008).
137. See William Meade Fletcher, Federal Antitrust Law - Rule of Reason, 10A
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 4982 (2007) ("The term 'relevant market' encompasses no-
tions of geography as well as product use, quality and description."). "A geo-
graphic market extends to the area of effective competition where buyers can turn
for alternative sources of supply." Id.
138. NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers, 419 F.3d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians and Surgeons v. Am. Bd. Of Podia-
tric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 1999)).
139. See Holmes, supra note 54 (stressing importance of identifying relevant
market).
140. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 95 (1984) (reaf-
firming district court definition of relevant market as "live college football
television").
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Court delineated the NCAA's restraint of competition as: fixing the
prices for telecasts, threatening sanctions on member schools and
placing artificial limits on the number of televised games with no
regard to consumer demand.14' In the subject dispute, the relevant
market can best be described as web-based competition between
the NHL and other sports entertainment providers.
142
2. The NHL Lacks Market Power in the Relevant Market
The first step in establishing a violation under the Rule of Rea-
son analysis is to assess whether the defendant possesses market
power in the relevant market in which the alleged anticompetitive
activity occurs. 143 Market power is defined as the capacity of an en-
terprise to restrict output and increase prices above those that
would be charged in a competitive market, or, similarly, the ability
to control price or exclude competition. 44 For instance, in NCAA,
the Supreme Court emphasized that the NCAA possessed market
power over college football telecasts because telecasts generated an
"audience uniquely attractive to advertisers" and competitors were
unable to offer analogous programming to attract a comparable au-
dience.1 45 Advertisers were willing to pay a premium price per
viewer to broadcast during college football because of their demo-
graphic characteristics.
146
In contrast, in Bulls I, the Seventh Circuit viewed market power
more expansively, comparing the NBA product not only to sports
broadcasts but to all entertainment on television to conclude that
the league's programming only attracted a small fraction of view-
141. See id. (reciting restraints in that market).
142. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (identifying NHL and other sports en-
tertainment providers as relevant market).
143. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir.
1992) (quoting Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th
Cir. 1985) (" [T] he first step in any Rule of Reason case is an assessment of market
power"). "Because a violation of the rule of reason is not ordinarily established
merely by showing that the plaintiffs business has been injured or that a single
competitor has been removed from the relevant product market,the issue as to
whether a firm possesses market power may facilitate the determination." 54 AM.
JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 49 (2008).
144. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38 (defining market power); see also Holmes,
supra note 53 ("Market power is variously defined as the 'ability to control price or
exclude competition' or as the power to 'raise prices and restrict output."').
145. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 112 (finding NCAA possessed market power with
respect to college football broadcasts because no alternative programming
existed).
146. See id. at 111 (noting NCAA football's market power based on its unique
demographic characteristics).
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ers.' 47 Because of the relatively trivial magnitude of viewership,
NBA national broadcasts could not be considered as having
"uniquely attractive" qualities to advertisers. 1 48 Additionally, even if
the NBA did sustain unique viewers, advertisers could reach such
audiences through other sports and entertainment programs, such
as advertisements for basketball games during sitcoms and other
programs, implying that the league's viewer market "extend[ed]
well beyond weekend sports programming."'1 49 Furthermore, ad-
vertisers paid no more for commercials during NBA games than
any other sports and substantially less than other forms of entertain-
ment; as a result, "higher prices, the hallmark of a reduction in
output, [were] missing."'150
Similarly, the NHL does not possess market power in the broad
entertainment and advertising markets in which it competes. 15 1
Even assuming that the market for web-based competition involves
just professional leagues and sports media entities, the NHL.com
website would still only account for three percent of "unique visi-
tor" traffic among the top twenty sports websites.152 In fact, it
ranked as only the twelfth most-visited sports website in April 2007
according to one Internet traffic source, even though the NHL was
beginning the Stanley Cup playoffs. 15 3 The NHL's lack of market
power is further confirmed by its television ratings for the Stanley
147. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir.
1992) (suggesting NBA had little market power because it was viewed only by rela-
tively small portion of consumers).
148. See id. (rejecting "uniquely attractive to advertisers" standard because of
minor audience in comparison to other entertainment programs).
149. See id. (explaining that advertisers could reach same demographic with-
out having to advertise during NBA games).
150. See id. (comparing advertisers' payment for NBA commercials against
other entertainment entities). "During 1990 the cost per thousand viewers (CPM)
of a regular-season NBA network game was $8.17. NCAA football fetched $11.50,
and viewers of prime-time programs were substantially more expensive. The CPM
for L.A. Law was $19.34, the CPM for Coach $13.40." Id.
151. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (concluding NHL lacks market power
in sports website market).
152. Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 54 (quantifying
NHL market power through Internet traffic to NHL.com).
153. See id. (citing online sports networks more popular than NHL.com).
These sites included:
ESPN.com (more than six times the number of U.S. visitors), FOX Sports
on MSN (more than five times the number of U.S. visitors), MLB.com
(more than four times the number of U.S. visitors), NFL.com (nearly
three times the number of U.S. visitors), CSTV.com (more than one and
a half times as many U.S. visitors) and CBS Sportsline (also more than
one and a half times as many U.S. visitors).
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Cup Finals, which roughly correlate with the popularity of the prod-
ucts supplied by other sports leagues. 154 According to Nielsen rat-
ings data, the Finals attracted a far smaller television audience than
the championships of MLB, the NBA, and the NFL. 155
3. NHL New Media Strategy Does Not Harm Competition in the
Market
The Rule of Reason requires that the challenged actions
amounted to a conspiracy against the market through a concerted
attempt to reduce output, drive up prices, detrimentally affect effi-
ciency or otherwise reduce consumer welfare. 156 Merely proving
that defendants harmed plaintiffs is insufficient in demonstrating
an antitrust violation because "antitrust laws protect competition,
not particular competitors." 157 Accordingly, MSG was only able to
allege potential injury to its own business through: (1) an inability
to cross-market other businesses owned by Cablevision; and (2) lost
tickets sales, sponsorship, advertising and merchandising due to
"lost goodwill and reputation" because its business would be di-
verted to NHL.com and other team websites.1 58
Evidence provided by other NHL team owners, however, indi-
cated that some teams were inefficiently utilizing their technology
platforms, thereby foregoing increased e-commerce growth oppor-
tunities. 159 Prior to the New Media Strategy, the member teams
154. See id. at 55 (correlating television viewership to overall popularity to
indicate lack of market power).
155. See id. (noting great disparity in ratings between NHL Finals and other
championships). Games 1 and 2 of the 2007 Stanley Cup Finals, broadcasted on
the cable channel Versus, attained ratings of less than one Nielsen point, and
Games 3 through 5, aired on NBC, averaged a 1.6 rating. Id. In contrast, the 2007
NBA finals averaged a 6.2 rating on ABC, the 2006 World Series averaged a 10.1 on
FOX, and the Super Bowl generated a 42.6 rating on CBS. Id. For a further dis-
cussion of the NHL's ratings troubles, see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
156. See Fletcher, supra note 137 (describing types of harm demonstrable
under Rule of Reason); see also Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994)
(providing examples of evidence to assist in proving restraint).
157. Fletcher, supra note 137 (stating that it is insufficient to show harm to
plaintiff alone to prove violation of antitrust law). Antitrust laws are designed to
protect against forbidden practices, not from individual loss of profits through
continued competition. See id.
158. See Declaration of Scott Richman in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction at 9-11, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, 2007 WL
3254421 (No. 07 CIV. 8455 (LAP)) (asserting diversion of Internet traffic from
Rangers' website to NHL and team websites and inability to promote own local
interests would harm Rangers brand).
159. See Declaration of Keith Ritter at 6, Madison Square Garden, L.P. v.
NHL, 2007 WL 3254421 (No. 07 CIV. 8455 (LAP)) (recounting surveys provided
by team owners detailing revenue generated by new media before and after imple-
mentation of New Media Strategy).
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generated approximately $5.5 million in revenue through new me-
dia, though clubs spent approximately $5.75 million in expenses. 160
As a result, financial results ranged from a league low loss of
$278,950 to a high profit of $389,213, with most revenue resulting
from broad sponsorship and advertisements that were spread across
various media and notjust tied to website promotion. 161 Under the
New Media Strategy, clubs' annual expenditures would be reduced
to approximately $3.7 million per year. 162 Also, clubs would only
need to retain a minimal technical staff to create local content.163
Moreover, even if the Rangers' complaints were construed as
generally harming both interbrand and intrabrand competition,
and not just MSG as a single competitor, such assertions are contra-
dicted by other team owners. 164 For instance, the Minnesota Wild,
owned by Minnesota Sports & Entertainment ("MSE"), a media
conglomerate similar to MSG, has found that the New Media Strat-
egy still allows for customized interconnectivity tools, such that MSE
can promote its other sports and entertainment properties. 165
Likewise, Washington Capitals' owner Ted Leonsis emphasized that
the common platform and template permitted the team to improve
its local advertising and sponsorship revenue, while also attracting
fans through a user-friendly web experience. 166
160. See id. (stating range of loss and profit prior to common platform agree-
ment). The Rangers also operated at a loss during this period, as:
[t]he Club had only one employee working on the organization's new
media business and, in 2005-06, had sustained a loss of more than
$100,000 on its new media business, including its website. The only reve-
nue the Club had realized from its website was allocated from broader
sponsorship deals, and the Club had earned no revenue from direct web-
site sponsorship, advertising, subscriptions, ticket service providers, mail-
ing list rental or otherwise.
Id. at 7.
161. See id. at 6 (finding even profitable teams generated majority of reve-
nue from advertising and sponsorship deals not exclusively tied to website
medium).
162. See id. at 15 (asserting contemplated lower operational costs).
163. See id. (touting decreased costs resulting from New Media Strategy).
164. For a further discussion of owners' opinions with the agreement, see in-fta notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
165. See Declaration of Robert O. Naegele,Jr. at 8, Madison Square Garden,
L.P. v. NHL, 2007 WL 3254421 (No. 07 CIV. 8455 (LAP)) ("[T]he customized
interconnectivity tools the League has provided to our website . . . allow[ ] Wild
fans to link easily to all of MSE's other sports and entertainment properties, in-
cluding our arena, our other professional sports franchises and our theater and
concert venues."). In fact, the Wild was one of three teams that previously op-
posed the New Media Strategy in voting. Id. at 5.
166. See Declaration of Ted Leonsis, supra note 115, at 15 (contradicting
MSG's assertion that centralized platform decreased ability to negotiate local spon-
sorships and advertisers).
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More importantly, the standardized template, common tech-
nology platform and single CMS do not act to the detriment of con-
sumers, both fans and advertisers alike.1 67 The standardized
formats, easy-to-use "best of breed" tools and cross-team linkages
enhance the visitor's experience by making navigation from one
website to another familiar. 168 By consolidating resources and dif-
fusing the best practices among team webmasters, the league can
invest in infrastructure and new technology, as well as focus on cre-
ating content and innovative features that could be made available
for all clubs. 169 Finally, the platform enhances the value of com-
mon space on team websites to advertisers and sponsors, and allows
advertisers to efficiently purchase this space. 17° Based on these effi-
ciencies, the New Media Strategy constituted appropriate action be-
cause "antitrust law permits, indeed encourages, cooperation inside
a business organization the better to facilitate competition between
that organization and other producers.''
4. The New Media Strategy Cannot Be Achieved in a Substantially Less
Restrictive Manner
A restriction is not reasonable, however, if the objectives
achieved by the restraint could be accomplished in a manner less
restrictive to free competition. 172 The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary or
167. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir.
1996) ("The core question in antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output
in some market, to the detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem.");
see also Sullivan v. NFL 34 F.3d 1091, 1096 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Injury to competition
has also been described more generally in terms of decreased efficiency in the market-
place which negatively impacts consumers." ).
168. Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 1 50 (dispelling
harm to consumers).
169. See Declaration of Keith Ritter, supra note 159, at 15 ("Club websites
will feature 'best of breed' tools to, among other things, enhance podcasting, en-
able community building and increase video integration capabilities.").
170. See id. at 38 (stressing platform efficiencies for advertisers and
sponsors).
171. Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship, 95 F.3d at 598
172. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *9 ("The burden then shifts back to MSG to prove either that the
challenged restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the League's procompe-
titive justifications or that those objectives may be achieved in a manner less restric-
tive of free competition."); see also NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d. 1249, 1259 (C.A.N.Y.
1982) ("[T]he existence of (less restrictive) alternatives is obviously of vital con-
cern in evaluating putatively anticompetitive conduct."). "One basic tenet of the
rule of reason is that a given restriction is not reasonable, that is, its benefits can-
not outweigh its harm to competition, if a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to
the policy exists that would provide the same benefits as the current restraint."
Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1103.
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that the same benefits could be reached though substantially less
restrictive means.'73 For example, in NFL v. Sullivan, in which an
uncodified league policy prevented the sale of ownership interest in
an NFL club to the public through offerings of publicly traded
stock, the First Circuit held that a less restrictive alternative would
have yielded the same benefits as the policy in place.174 Alterna-
tively, the NFL could have amended the ownership policy to allow
the sale of minority, nonvoting shares of team stock to the public
with restrictions on the size of holdings by any one individual,
thereby preserving the restraint's intended benefits of maintaining
private control of the member teams and avoiding conflicts of
interest. 175
Conversely, the NHL could not have enacted a less restrictive
alternative to the New Media Strategy.176 Foremost, the CMS plat-
form and standardized template were necessary to promote the
NHL brand and maintain minimum quality levels on, and sufficient
connectivity among, team websites.' 7 7 Additionally, teams are still
responsible for supplying local content, sponsorships and advertis-
ing to the common platform which is flexible enough to accommo-
date teams' preferences with regard to website style. 178 Therefore,
the NHL New Media Strategy framework is reasonably structured to
further common league interests while still permitting clubs to ap-
peal to the needs of their fan base by "taking advantage of their
presumably superior knowledge of local conditions and tastes." 179
173. See Pelnar, supra note 42, at 43 (noting burden of proof in demonstrat-
ing alternative measures).
174. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d 1091 at 1103 (striking down NFL policy prohibiting
public ownership).
175. See id. (describing alternative measure to precluding ownership by
public).
176. See infra notes 178-79 (reasoning that NHL had no alternatives to its cho-
sen action).
177. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (justifying New Media Strategy because
of teams' under-utilization of Internet media). The New Media Committee, which
found that many clubs were not making use of websites for marketing or sales
promotions tools at all, failed to utilize the best practices or up-to-date technology,
and had not monetized their websites. See id.
178. Declaration of Keith Ritter, supra note 159, at 15 (asserting that plat-
form is responsive to local needs as well).
179. See Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 71 (acknowl-
edging benefits for both league entity and individuals teams).
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C. NHL Could Successfully Assert the "Single Entity" Defense
1. "Unity of Interest" Standard in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.
The Copperweld or "single entity" defense proposes that the co-
ordinated activity of a parent corporation and its wholly-owned sub-
sidiary must be viewed as a single enterprise with "complete unity of
interest."180 A complete unity of interest exists when " [t]heir objec-
tives are common . . . [and] their ... actions are guided or deter-
mined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one."18 1
Accordingly, ownership and control are essential in a determina-
tion of whether unity of purpose and action exist.18 2 Once a parent
company and its subsidiary are found to be acting as one entity, the
parent is incapable of engaging in a combination or conspiracy in
violation of antitrust law, since a single enterprise cannot conspire
with itself.183 In addition, the single entity defense offers a flexible
approach in response to the increasing complexity of corporate op-
erations, so that the substance of the business enterprise, and not
the form, determines whether economic actors can be considered a
singular unit.184
2. Early Application to Professional Sports Leagues
Courts have demonstrated a prevailing hostility towards the sin-
gle entity defense in the context of traditionally structured sports
180. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984) (finding that parent and subsidiary may have "unity of purpose or a com-
mon design" for antitrust purposes).
181. Id. at 771 (defining unity of interest).
182. See id. at 780 ("Common control was one of the instruments in bringing
about unity of purpose and unity of action and in making the conspiracy effec-
tive."); see also Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control, and the Single Entity De-
fense in Antitrust, at 7 (Jan. 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/
221876.pdf (last visited February 29, 2008) ("The suggestion in Copperweld and in
the entire body of single entity case law is plain: 'ownership' and 'control' are
related, and both inform analysis of the single entity question.").
183. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (" [C] oordinated activity of a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a 'single enterprise' for pur-
poses of § 1 of the Sherman Act."); see also Williamson, supra note 181, at 3 ("Defin-
ing any one type of corporate structure as a single entity relieves it from scrutiny,
because one needs more than one distinct entity to allege a conspiracy.").
184. See Coppeneld, 467 U.S. at 772 (explaining that antitrust liability should
not depend on how corporate subunit is organized, whether as unincorporated
division or wholly-owned subsidiary). Allowing combination or conspiracy be-
tween a parent and subsidiary would "elevate [ ] form over substance - while in
form the two corporations are separate legal entities, in substance they are a single
integrated enterprise and hence cannot comprise the plurality of actors necessary
to satisfy § 1." Id. at 789.
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leagues, continually resolving that teams are individual actors and
not components of a single enterprise. 18 5 Foremost, in NCAA, the
Supreme Court stated that a sports league, like otherjoint ventures,
has "no immunity from the antitrust laws."'81 6 The Copperweld de-
fense was more definitively rebuffed in North American Soccer League
v. NFL, in which the Second Circuit explained that a single-entity
loophole for sports leagues would eliminate "antitrust responsibility
for any restraint . . .that would benefit the[ ] league . . . even
though the benefit would be outweighed by its anticompetitive ef-
fects." 187 Also, more recently, the Sixth Circuit held that member
clubs of the Ontario Hockey League in Canada constituted multi-
ple actors who acted in concert, and not as a single entity, in a claim
that the teams engaged in conspiracy to restrain trade by adopting
an eligibility rule for "overage" players. 188
3. Refinement of Analysis in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd.
Partnership v. NBA
In contrast, in a later dispute between the Chicago Bulls and
NBA over national broadcast rights, the Seventh Circuit ruled that
professional sports leagues can potentially be construed to be act-
ing as a single entity in certain circumstances, "depending on which
facet of the business one examines;" therefore, the single entity
185. See Posting of Marc Edelman to Sports Law Blog, MSG v. NHL II: Can the
NHL Apply a Single-Entity Defense Based on American Needle?, http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/2007/10/msg-v-nhl-ii-can-nhl-apply-single.html (Oct. 8, 2007,
11:06 EST) [hereinafter MSG v. NHL 1] (stating that courts have typically rejected
the single entity defense as applied to sports leagues); see also NASL v. NFL, 670
F.2d 1249, 1257 (C.A.N.Y. 1982) ("The theory that a combination of actors can
gain exemption from [section] 1 of the Sherman Act by acting as a joint venture'
has repeatedly been rejected by the Supreme Court and the Sherman Act has been
held applicable to professional sports teams by numerous lesser federal courts.").
186. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (find-
ing joint ventures amenable to antitrust violations).
187. NASL, 670 F.2d at 1257 (rejecting single entity exemption status for pro-
fessional sports leagues). "[T]he restraint might be one adopted more for the
protection of individual league members from competition than to help the
league." Id.
188. See NHLPA v. Plymouth Whalers, 419 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing hockey league to be multiple actors and not single entity, since existence was
only constituted by twenty member teams). The OHL rules permitted each team
to carry only three twenty-year old, "overage" players. Id. at 466. Furthermore,
under Rule 7.4, no overage player could be signed by an OHL team without previ-
ously playing in the Canadian Hockey Association ("CHA") or USA Hockey
Player's Registration the previous season. See id. As a result, certain NCAA players,
who were not permitted to hold either type of registration, were precluded under
the "overage" eligibility rule. See id.
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question of Copperweld should be posed on a case-by-case basis. 189
The court noted that, unlike the NCAA, which was defined as a
joint venture by the Supreme Court, the NBA "has no existence
independent of sports" and was created only to "make" professional
basketball teams and games. 190
Based on Copperweld, "NBA Basketball" could be viewed as one
product from a single source when selling broadcast rights to a net-
work, in competition with a multitude of other producers of en-
tertainment, 'Just as General Motors is a single firm even though a
Corvette differs from a Chevrolet."' 9' In other instances, though,
NBA teams act more like distinct and independent firms in a mo-
nopsony, such as when college basketball players seek to sell their
skills in order to be drafted.1 92 In these cases, the NBA would best
be understood as ajoint venture for antitrust purposes because the
league curtails competition for players who have few other market
opportunities. 193
Additionally, the court rejected the "complete unity of inter-
est" determination in Copperweld, holding that whether an enter-
prise is conflict-free is not necessarily dispositive in the
determination of whether the league is a single entity. 94 Rather,
Copperweld proposed that the concerted action requirement exists
simply to scrutinize conduct that "deprives the marketplace of the
independent centers of decision-making that competition as-
189. See Chicago Prof 1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
1996) [hereinafter Bulls HI] ("Coppenveld does not hold that only conflict-free enter-
prises may be treated as single entities. Instead it asks why the antitrust laws distin-
guish between unilateral and concerted action, and then assigns a parent-
subsidiary group to the 'unilateral' side in light of those functions."). In Bulls II,
the Chicago Bulls sought to increase the number of games televised on WGN from
25 or 30 games to 41, while the NBA sought to impose a "tax" on nationally broad-
cast games. Id. at 595.
190. Id. at 599 (structuring NBA and teams as single entity in production of
"NBA Basketball" product).
191. Id. at 598 (holding NBA to be one firm for purpose of selling broadcast-
ing rights because single product is produced and cooperation is essential).
192. See id. at 599 (illustrating how leagues may constitute single entities
based on facet of business examined).
193. See id. (suggesting NBA would not be considered single entity for draft
purposes).
194. Id. at 598 (finding even single firm may not have complete unity of inter-
est); see also Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 277 (8th Cir.
1988) ("Even though the cooperatives may quarrel among themselves on how to
divide the spoils of their economic power, it cannot reasonably be said that they
are independent sources of that power."). "Their power depends, and has always
depended, on the cooperation among themselves .... The disagreements we have
described are more like those among the board members of a single enterprise,
than those among enterprises which are themselves separate and independent."
Id.
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sumes. ' 195 Despite concluding that the league is closer to one en-
terprise than a group of independent firms when acting in the
broadcast market, the Seventh Circuit stopped short of declaring
the NBA a single entity and remanded the case for a fact-specific
inquiry into the nature of the league. 196
4. Finding the Existence of a Single Entity in American Needle, Inc.
v. New Orleans, Louisiana Saints
The single entity defense was successfully applied in American
Needle, which arose from a dispute between NFL Properties and
American Needle, Inc. over NFL-delegated intellectual property
rights. 19 7 NFL Properties, which held the responsibility of assisting
in the development and protection of various marks, as well as im-
plementing marketing strategies for the league, had granted Ameri-
can Needle a license to use the league's trademarks to manufacture
headwear. 19 8 When NFL Properties entered into an exclusive li-
censing agreement with Reebok in 2000, American Needle lost its
license and promptly sued under section 1.199
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dis-
missed the claim under the single entity defense, concluding that
the NFL member teams had so integrated their operations as to
create a single enterprise for licensing purposes, rather than ajoint
venture cooperating for a common purpose.2 0 0 The court empha-
sized that the NFL was structured to maintain a competitive bal-
ance, since teams agreed to share equally in the market and had
195. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984) (distinguishing concerted action from unilateral behavior).
196. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d at 600, 602 ("[W]e
conclude that when acting in the broadcast market the NBA is closer to a single
firm than to a group of independent firms.").
197. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans, Louisiana Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d
941, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (describing assignment of intellectual property rights to
NFL Properties by team owners).
198. See id. (detailing responsibilities of NFL Properties under various
agreements).
199. See id. (stating that antitrust suit arose when NFL Properties granted ex-
clusive licensing rights to Reebok).
200. See id. at 943 (finding NFL and teams acted as single entity for licensing
of intellectual property). See generally Am. Needle Inc. v. National Football League,
538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court decision). "Simply put, noth-
ing in § 1 prohibits the NFL teams from cooperating so the league can compete
against other entertainment providers. Indeed, antitrust law encourages coopera-
tion inside a business organization - such as, in this case, a professional sports
league - to foster competition between that organization and its competitors." Id.
at 744.
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done so continuously since 1963.201 Through NFL Properties, the
clubs had acted as an undivided economic unit by sharing equally
in the market and, as a result, each separate ownership group, in
essence, had no economic significance in and of itself.
20 2
The decision, however, was greatly criticized due to its "cursory
analysis" and disregard for existing case law that had deemed the
single entity defense inapplicable to sports leagues. 20 3 Critics
chided the implication that, because the NFL had been merchan-
dising paraphernalia in a collective manner through its history,
such "prolonged collusion" could transform a joint venture into a
single entity.
204
5. MSG Can Successfully Establish a Single Entity Defense
Is the NHL a joint venture comprised of separate teams acting
jointly or a single firm controlled by a board of directors with re-
gard to the New Media Strategy?20 5 The NHL has two analyses at its
disposal in arguing that the league constitutes a single entity for
Internet marketing purposes, one categorizing antitrust claims as
either labor or non-labor disputes, the other appealing to the eco-
nomic concept of complementarity.
20 6
a. The NHL as a Single Entity Under Copperwelds "Unity of
Interest"
To assert a single entity defense based on the rationale of Cop-
perweld, the NHL must illustrate that the league is effectively inte-
201. See Am. Needle, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 943 ("There is no sudden joining
of independent sources of economic power previously pursuing separate interests.
NFL Properties has been making the decisions unilaterally or jointly since 1963.").
The court also emphasized that "[d] elegated decision-making does not deprive the
marketplace of independent centers of decision-making." Id.
202. See id. at 944 (holding NFL acted as single unit, and American Needle
never dealt with any teams exclusively).
203. See MSG v. NHL II, supra note 184 (rebuking court in American Needle for
lack of detailed explanation for its ruling).
204. Id. (criticizing that opinion seemed to imply that, because NFL had been
merchandising team paraphernalia collectively for many years, it was automatically
transformed from joint venture to single entity). "A single-entity defense based on
prolonged collusion by multiple entities is simply illogical." Id.
205. See Mathias, supra note 40, at 212 (distinguishing joint ventures from sin-
gle entities).
206. See generally Nathaniel Grow, Note, There's No "I" in "League:" Professional
Sports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 183, 201 (2006) (divid-
ing between labor and non-labor antitrust claims); see also Williamson, supra note
182, at 4 (analyzing antitrust cases under complementarity test).
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grated as a single entity with an economic "unity of interest."20 7
The Copperweld test is an inquiry into the concentration of control
rights; the alleged single entity must demonstrate a hierarchical
structure in which it delegates functions to other units who either
possess no rights of control or maintain some control that may
nonetheless be abrogated. 20 8
For the NHL to successfully evince that it operates as a single
entity, it should seize upon the categorization insinuated in Bulls H
and distinguish existing antitrust case law involving league labor
disputes and suits by players against team owners from entirely non-
labor suits to better categorize where a "unity of interest" exists. 209
In the context of labor disputes, the various teams comprising the
league do not share a common goal but, instead, have divergent
concerns in the labor market.210 Though teams typically depend
on competitive balance and low labor costs, each is still primarily
focused on obtaining the best players, coaches and management
personnel possible because winning increases ticket and merchan-
dising revenue, leading to greater overall profits. 21 1 Therefore, the
unity of economic interest in labor disputes is not sufficient to sat-
isfy the Copperweld standard.212 Likewise, the economic realities of
labor disputes also fail to justify granting sports leagues antitrust
exemption in such instances because owners could exploit an anti-
trust exemption to implement unilateral, abusive labor practices
without consulting player unions. 213
In contrast, traditionally-structured sport leagues such as the
NHL should be considered single entities for non-labor antitrust
disputes because of their structure as single firms. 214 Foremost,
207. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771(1984) (defining standard for exemption as "complete unity of interest").
208. See Williamson, supra note 182, at 12 (finding "ownership" and "control"
central to single entity claim under Copperweld).
209. Grow, supra note .206, at 188 "In applying Copperweld to professional
sports leagues, the circuit courts have failed to distinguish between suits involving
nonlabor disputes and those involving suits by players against team owners.").
210. See id. at 205 (explaining that, in labor matters, teams vie against one
another as competitors).
211. See id. at 206 (listing reasons why teams are not acting with one interest).
212. See id. (concluding that interests of teams diverge in labor market).
213. See id. at 207-08 ("Granting professional sports leagues single entity pro-
tection in labor disputes would run contrary to Supreme Court precedent and
would jeopardize players' ability to enforce their rights under current labor law
doctrine.").
214. See Williamson, supra note 182, at 10 ("Traditional corporate hierarchy
constitutes an obvious benchmark against which to contrast 'economic unity' in
other governance structures, and it constitutes a benchmark that Copperweld and
succeeding case law inserted into the single entity case law.").
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professional teams, and particularly those in the NHL, generate
most of their revenue locally from ticket sales and the licensing of
television broadcasts. 215 Because the overwhelming majority of
teams within a league operate in different media markets, they
predominantly sustain a hometown fan base. 216 As a result, eco-
nomic competition only occurs amongst each league as opposing
forms of entertainment. 217
Moreover, the NHL,. like most other professional leagues, also
operates under a revenue-sharing agreement, as teams in the bot-
tom half of league revenue that reside in demographic market ar-
eas of 2.5 million or fewer television households are entitled to
league assistance.218 Because of this revenue allocation, the eco-
nomic success of each member team in the NHL is directly depen-
dant upon the profitability of other clubs.
219
Finally, much like in Bulls II and American Needle, where agree-
ments voted on and approved by team owners granted central con-
trol of national broadcasting and merchandising rights to the
league, the NHL owners have ceded their authority to indepen-
dently operate team websites in order to create a national brand
through the distribution and exploitation of intellectual property
rights on the web.220 In fact, even where clubs have retained cer-
tain rights to use their marks for local Internet marketing efforts,
their activities are still subject to NHL control and must be consis-
215. See Grow, supra note 206, at 192 (stating that most revenue of teams de-
rived at local level); see also McErlain, supra note 13 (providing breakdown of NHL
revenue).
216. See Grow, supra note 206, at 193 (noting majority of teams typically do
not compete for fan loyalty but operate in different media markets).
217. See id. (proposing that various professional sports teams in same city
compete amongst each other for fans, not teams within sport in different locales).
"MLB's Detroit Tigers compete for Detroiters' entertainment dollars with the
NBA's Detroit Pistons, the NFL's Detroit Lions, and the NHL's Detroit Red Wings,
in addition to other forms of entertainment, such as movies, theater, and con-
certs." Id.
218. See NHL.com - Collective Bargaining Agreement FAQs, http://
www.nhl.com/nhlhq/cba/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2008) (explaining reve-
nue-sharing agreement in current CBA).
219. See id. (illustrating that teams share common interest in management
and economic growth of league). "All Clubs that: (1) are ranked in the bottom
half (bottom 15) in League revenues, and (2) operate in markets with a Demo-
graphic Market Area of 2.5 million or fewer TV households" qualify for revenue-
sharing subsidies. Id.
220. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (describing that NHL granted Commis-
sioner broad discretion over intellectual property rights, including "authority to
make directives regarding advertising and merchandising rights").
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tent with the league's licensing activities. 221 Therefore, because the
NHL maintains ultimate authority over general league decision-
making, and specifically in the context of intellectual property
rights through agreements approved by the Board of Governors, it
should be found to possess the requisite unity of interest to satisfy
the single entity exemption. 222
b. The NHL as a Single Entity Under "Actual or Potential
Competitors" Test
If the NHL fails to constitute a single entity under a strict eco-
nomic unity test, the league could also be viewed as one enterprise
under a more comprehensive "actual or potential competitors"
test.223 The actual or potential competitors test, proposed in Mt.
Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, is one of complementarity,
testing the extent that the candidate single entity joins complemen-
tary assets, capabilities or other inputs together. 224
Two types of complementarity drive the economics of sports
leagues, demand-side network effects and supply-side network ef-
fects.225 Demand-side network effects reflect that the production of
goods or services requires the input of multiple entities, as parties
collectively contribute complementary raw materials, without which
each party would be unable to compete effectively.226 For profes-
sional sports leagues, teams contribute such inputs through the
"production" of games; teams constitute complements, not actual
or potential competitors, because consumers perceive the value of
games based on the number of participating teams in the
"network."227
Though demand-side network effects alone may justify viewing
teams as a single entity, supply-side network effects, such as league-
sanctioned standards and the promotion of league-sanctioned com-
221. See Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 21 (asserting
extent of control of NHL in exploitation of intellectual property fights).
222. See Madison Square Garden, 2007 WL 3254421, at *2 (describing unani-
mous resolutions by team owners to give NHL exclusive control over Internet
rights).
223. See Williamson, supra note 182, at 4 ("A finding that restraints are hori-
zontal is tantamount to a finding that parties are not contributing complementary
inputs and that the parties are 'actual or potential competitors.'").
224. See id. (providing factors by which control can be assessed).
225. See id. (delineating types of network effects to demonstrate economic
production of leagues as single entity).
226. See id. (showing singularity in action because each actor alone would be
unable to produce product otherwise).
227. See id. (explaining how teams act as single entity to produce games).
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petition, strengthen the structure of sports leagues as single entities
for antitrust purposes and not cartels of competitors. 228 Restraints
imposed by the governing bodies of professional sports leagues are
designed to promote the commercialization of the league as a
branded product.229 Thus, because they are a critical contribution
to the final production of games, league-imposed restraints can be
viewed as "vertical" and not illegal "horizontal" restraints.
230
For instance, in Bulls II, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the
production of "NBA Basketball" games, not generic "professional
basketball games," to imply that the NBA as a governing body con-
tributes complementary inputs into the production of games, par-
ticularly by supplying the "NBA" brand to a league-wide marketing
effort. 23 ' Likewise, the league can contribute to production of
league-branded games by imposing standards in rule-making and
organizing competition between member teams.
23 2
Similarly, the NHL must emphasize that combination is essen-
tial to produce the ultimate "NHL Hockey" product, even though
each franchise is independently owned. 233 As previously men-
tioned, the centralized CMS and standardized layout created by the
New Media Strategy collectively serve as a key element in the
league's growth as a national brand.23 4 The common website plat-
form allows for one distribution mechanism whereby the league ex-
ploits the economic value of its intellectual property rights under
the "NHL Brand."
23 5
228. See id. (expounding that league as governing body further shapes unity
of purpose of sports leagues).
229. See Williamson, supra note 182, at 24 (finding that league allows for
brand identification of product by entity).
230. See id. (concluding that action in creating league brand was accom-
plished vertically, not horizontally).
231. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir.
1996) (finding "NBA Basketball" produced by NBA and teams).
232. See Williamson, supra note 182, at 23 (providing other complementary
inputs to production of games by NBA).
233. See Grow, supra note 206, at 186-87 ("One, two, or even a handful of
teams cannot produce the ultimate league product: championship athletic com-
petition."). "[M]aintaining competitive balance necessarily requires interaction
among all teams in the league. Without a league structure to create and uphold
competitive balance, competitions would just be glorified 'pick-up games."' Id. at
196; see also Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 116, at 9 (finding struc-
tured manner of NHL allows for more marketable product than simply different
squads playing one another).
234. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2007
WL 3254421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (ruling New Media Strategy primary to
promoting national brand and competing against other entertainment entities).
235. See id. (reciting brand-building strategy).
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Finally, the league could refer to the precedential standard set
in San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, which extended single entity sta-
tus to the NHL for purposes of team relocation, based on a comple-
mentarity analysis. 236 In San Francisco Seals, the District Court for
the Central District of California concluded that the league and
teams were not economic competitors but rather, members of a sin-
gle unit competing with other similar professional leagues and
bound under an organizational scheme approved by all team mem-
bers through the Board of Governors.23 7 Therefore, the league
could analogize the New Media Strategy to the Board of Governors-
approved agreement in San Francisco Seals to illustrate action as a
single entity, because in both instances, owners officially relin-
quished individual rights for the purpose of centralized decision-
making to better compete with entertainment generated by other
professional sports, as well as "produc[e] sporting events of uni-
formly high quality.., so as to assure all members of the league the
best financial return. 238
V. FrvE FOR FIGHTING: THE IMPACT OF MSG v. NHL
The denial of a preliminary injunction by the District Court for
the Southern District of New York appropriately maintains the sta-
tus quo for suits brought against professional sports leagues under
the Sherman Act through strict adherence to the rationale of NCAA
and its progeny. 239 The decision further reinforces the legitimacy
of collectivization by teams through a central league entity, ac-
knowledging the importance of unity to foster successful national
sports brands. 240 Likewise, the holding protects smaller-market
teams from second-class status and promotes balanced competi-
236. See generally San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F.Supp. 966 (D.C. Cal.
1974) (holding league and teams acting together as one single business enterprise
competing against other professional leagues).
237. See id. at 969 ("As a member team, it will continue cooperating with the
defendants in pursuit of its main purpose, i.e., producing sporting events of uni-
formly high quality appropriately scheduled as to both time and location so as to
assure all members of the league the best financial return."). "In this respect, the
plaintiff and defendants are acting together as one single business enterprise, com-
peting against other similarly organized professional leagues." Id.
238. Id.
239. For a discussion on the decision's conformity with existing case law, see
supra notes 85-236 and accompanying text.
240. For a discussion on the importance of production of league brands see
supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
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tion. 241 At the same time, MSG also greatly expands the extent of
leagues' control and ability to exploit teams' intellectual property
and marketing from the traditional realms of broadcast media and
licensing to the Internet. 242 In short, through this decision, sports
leagues including the NHL are encouraged to continue to create
markets and structure integration agreements for efficiency and
maximum profitability to promote a better product both on and off
the playing field... or ice. 243
By avoiding the single entity question, however, the district
court in MSG left unresolved the more pressing question of
whether the NHL and other professional sports leagues should be
susceptible to antitrust violations at all.24a Though any ruling by
the court would not have resolved whether leagues are considered
single entities in other jurisdictions - and, in fact, would actually
have created further discord amongst the circuits - it could have
provided the first clear bright-line economic analysis and justifica-
tion of the circumstances and rationale under which professional
sports leagues should be exempt from antitrust violations.
245
If recognized as single entities for non-labor purposes, tradi-
tional sports leagues would benefit from the knowledge that they
can freely restructure and reorganize their operations to best serve
league interests without having to raise assumptions of illegitimate
motives.246 By contracting to place decision-making power in the
hands of a central league office, a league can make decisions that
serve the purposes of the league as a whole, rather than individual
owners.247 Furthermore, single entity status would allow leagues to
241. For a discussion on the competitive balance on the field created through
collectivization and exploitation of intellectual property rights, see supra notes 118-
20 and accompanying text.
242. See generally Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP),
2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (recognizing procompetitive efficiencies
of Internet and new media restraints).
243. For a discussion of the justifications for collectivizing intellectual prop-
erty and marketing rights in new media, see supra notes 112-34 and accompanying
text.
244. See Grow, supra note 205, at 187 (finding single entity defense to be an
ongoing problem for professional sports leagues).
245. See id. ("In the twenty-two years since Copperweld, attempts by sports
leagues to advance the single entity defense have received a mixed response from
the circuit courts."). The Second, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have not reviewed the
defense since Coppenreld. See id. The First and Eighth Circuits have ruled against a
single entity exemption for sports leagues. See id. The Seventh Circuit has found
that leagues may be single entities for some purposes. See id.
246. See Mathias, supra note 40, at 220 n.189 (noting general presumption of
valid motives under single entity status).
247. See id. at 220 ("[T]he corporate league can prevent franchises from relo-
cating, realign divisions, and otherwise make decisions that serve the purposes of
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more easily achieve economies of scale through increased purchas-
ing power. 248 Finally, a single entity exemption would serve the
practical purpose of decreasing litigation costs for in-fighting occur-
ring within professional sports leagues, since teams would be forced
to challenge league restrictions as abuses of monopoly power under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, a more difficult claim to establish. 249
Until the single entity defense is accepted, however, the NHL
and other professional sports leagues will be continually threatened
with visits to the antitrust penalty box, as teams repeatedly instigate
fights over the control of league production.2 50
Michael Huntowski*
the league as a whole rather than individual owners."). A single entity model
would also protect the league from certain actions of an individual owner, such as
over-spending. See id. at n.98.
248. See id. (finding single entity status assists in market strength).
249. See id. at 214 (recognizing curtailing of antitrust claims if sports leagues
recognized as single entities). Section 2 is violated only when a firm possesses
monopoly power in a particular market and engages in behavior that is abusive of
that power. See id. at 206. Thus, "[t]he requirement that a section 2 defendant
possess monopoly power makes a section 2 claim much more difficult to pursue
than an action under section 1, which has no such requirement." Id.
250. See Grow, supra note 206, at 184 ("Like many other sectors of the na-
tional economy, professional sports have faced antitrust scrutiny - but arguably no
other sector has faced a more haphazard application."). "[B]ecause ... [the]
[c]ircuits have not re-examined the issue since Copperweld, their early, nonsingle
entity precedent has never been reversed. This single entity question remains a
live concern, as professional sports leagues continue to face antitrust challenges."
Id. at 187.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2006,
Boston College.
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